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ISRAEL-PALESTINE

Use of Force at the Gaza Border: A Hybrid Approach to Tactical Challenges
By Geo rey S. Corn, Peter Margulies

Wednesday, June 20, 2018, 7:00 AM

The recent confrontation at the Israel-Gaza border between thousands of Gazans and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) took a heavy human toll, raising concerns about
excessive uses of force and complex issues of international law. The Israeli High Court of Justice declined to order modi cation of the IDF’s rules and procedures that
dictate when, where and how its forces may employ lethal force. These rules appear to re ect what some consider a controversial hybrid response to the Gaza
confrontation, informed by both the law of armed con ict and the more restrictive rules on use of force derived from the traditional law enforcement paradigm. (See
commentary here and here on these IDF rules and procedures, and here and here on the high court’s decision.)
In our view, this hybrid approach was the appropriate and essential legal framework to guide the response to the confrontations engineered by Hamas, the terrorist
organization that controls Gaza and is its de facto government. We also believe, however, that the operations in response to these incidents raise legitimate questions
about some of the tactical choices made by the IDF. Accordingly, it is vital that the IDF take, in good faith, appropriate investigatory steps in response to any use of
force that appears to have been improper, consistent with the Israeli high court’s opinion. Such measures should identify whether disciplinary or criminal measures
are warranted and provide vital lessons learned to improve the effectiveness and credibility of future operations. Of equal importance, they would serve to rebut the
temptation to rush to judgment that every killing in these confrontations was unlawful. Indeed, any credible critique of IDF actions must be based on consideration of
the complex tactical situation those forces confronted; investigatory measures can help inform such analyses by providing greater transparency into the tactical
challenges faced by the IDF.
The Israeli government has advanced the legal position that the border confrontation arose in the context of Hamas’s long-running armed con ict with Israel. For the
IDF, therefore, operations in this situation fell within the scope of regulation under the law of armed con ict. Within the LOAC paradigm, however, the government
asserted (we believe quite properly) that certain aspects of these security operations were controlled by authority derived from a traditional law enforcement regime
and that imposition of this more limited use-of-force authority within the context of an ongoing armed con ict is inherent in the fabric of the law of armed con ict
itself.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth Watkin characterizes this as a “blended” application of the two branches of international law in his book “Fighting at the Legal Boundaries.” This
blended, or hybrid, approach—either innovative or anomalous, depending on your perspective—is at the core of legal assessment of the IDF’s handling of the Gaza
confrontation. And equally central to this assessment is the context in which the IDF exercised its use-of-force authority.
A central difference between the law of armed con ict and law enforcement regulatory regimes involves the scope of use-of-force authority. Under the LOAC conductof-hostilities paradigm, a state may authorize use of lethal force as a rst resort based on status determinations: against either another state’s forces or against
members of organized armed groups under the control of a hostile nonstate actor such as Hamas. (There are also other non-state armed groups operating in the Gaza
Strip, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad). To be targetable under LOAC, persons must be reasonably assessed as either belligerent subordinates of the organized
armed group or directly participating in hostilities (DPH); no further “imminence” assessment is required. While the exact contours of direct participation in
hostilities are subject to some debate, use of weapons against state security forces clearly falls within the scope of this concept, including the use of weapons in the
course of efforts to cross into that state’s territory. While there may be policy considerations that impose use-of-force restrictions against civilians directly
participating in such hostilities, as a matter of law the civilian who directly participates loses protection from deliberate attack for “such time” as they directly
participate.
In contrast, the law enforcement regime imposes more restrictive use-of-force rules on state security personnel. Under this regime, which is generally considered coextensive with international human rights law obligations related to use of force, state forces may employ lethal force against individuals only to repel an imminent
threat of death or substantial bodily harm to either state personnel or other civilians. In the context of a mass protest involving concerted efforts to gain immediate
proximity to potential victims of such violence, this threat can emanate from individuals or from the massed crowd itself, especially when there is a genuine risk of a
breach to a security barrier. However, even at this point, use of lethal force is permissible only when lesser measures have been exhausted or when it is reasonably
assessed that such measures will be ineffective at reducing the threat. When such harm is not imminent, state forces may use other types of force, to include “less
than lethal” civilian crowd-control measures such as batons, rubber bullets and tear gas.
While the majority view is that any use of “live re” (live ammunition red from guns) constitutes lethal force subject to the law enforcement regime’s narrow use-offorce rules, the Gaza situation raises the critical question of whether this assertion is, in some situations, overbroad. At the Gaza border, IDF personnel confronted a
mix of innocent civilians, civilians directly participating in hostilities and belligerent operatives. The publicly available facts suggest that the IDF forces reasonably
concluded that they faced an imminent threat of death or serious physical harm if they failed to act promptly and decisively to prevent a breach of the security fence.
In such exigent situations, can a defender use precisely employed live re that is intended to be nonlethal, such as precise sniper re aimed at the individual’s lower
extremities?
Many experts believe that security operations cannot be governed by a blended or hybrid application of these two legal regimes; that any given engagement must be
governed by either the law of armed con ict or the law enforcement paradigm. However, the unique circumstances of the Gaza con ict made this unitary
characterization impracticable. Hamas controls all massed public movement in Gaza, and the border confrontations arose because Hamas departed from the longstanding status quo by which it prevented massed encroachments on that security barrier. But it would be dangerously overbroad to assume that every civilian subject
to Hamas control during these protests quali ed as directly participating in hostilities.
Accordingly, to place the IDF’s action into proper focus, some aspects of that situation demand emphasis. First, Hamas’s strategic objective is not to defeat the IDF in
battle, something Hamas must know is not even remotely feasible. Instead, it is to delegitimize Israel (an objective that seemed to bear fruit almost immediately after
the rst confrontation) and, especially, to undermine Israeli use of force in response to Hamas threats. Hamas implemented this objective through two primary
tactics: rst, in icting casualties on IDF personnel and Israeli civilians; second, forcing the IDF to engage in countermeasures that in turn in icted casualties on
Palestinians. Super cially, the Gaza confrontations may have appeared to be civilian protests. In fact, the confrontations were orchestrated tactical maneuvers
speci cally intended to produce outcomes supporting Hamas’s broader strategic objective (see page 9 here for a graphic account of Hamas operatives’ use of the mass
confrontation as cover to maneuver closer to the fence).

Second, the Gaza border is in many ways unique, as it represents a divide between a state and a quasi-state engaged in a situation of ongoing hostilities. These
hostilities have been de ned by an ebb and ow in intensity, periodically aring up for a variety of reasons. Hamas has also employed constantly evolving tactics to
achieve its objectives of killing or capturing IDF personnel or in icting casualties on Israeli civilians. Those tactics include using rockets, in ltration tunnels, mortars,
improvised explosive devices and suicide vests. Some observers believe this demonstrates the “crude” or “minimal” capabilities of Hamas, but in truth it shows the
adaptability of a sophisticated armed group that utilizes low-tech weapons and tactics a countermeasure to high-tech. One need only consider the tunnels discovered
during Operation Protective Edge in 2014—tunnels each of us observed rsthand—to understand that low-tech measures can often be the product of carefully
calculated tactics to gain isolated advantage and produce the type of casualties that will trigger what will then be characterized as an excessive and heavy-handed
response.
From a threat-assessment perspective, the border confrontation might have been reasonably assessed by the IDF as the next Hamas tactical evolution. As Israel
develops its technology to locate and neutralize in ltration tunnels, Hamas appears to have developed another method for border penetrations in order to attack IDF
forces, security infrastructure and nearby residential areas. By inciting mobs to storm the border fence, Hamas is creating tactical opportunities that can be exploited
by armed operatives.
Third, in achieving those tactical goals, Hamas has habitually shown either indifference to the risk to Palestinian civilians or eagerness to exploit those civilians as
shields for its military operations.
The Gaza strategy of border confrontations is a case study in Hamas’s grim repertoire, re ecting a two-pronged design. First, Hamas sought to exploit the efforts by
thousands of Gazan civilians to storm and breach the barrier fence in order to enter Israeli territory. Many of these individuals were responding to three dynamics: (1)
the much-publicized movement of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, which cast additional doubt on the already-dim prospects for an equitable “ nalstatus agreement” between Israel and the Palestinians; (2) the advent on May 15 of what Palestinians call “Nakba Day” (the day of the catastrophe), which this year
memorialized the 70th anniversary of Israel’s Declaration of Independence, along with the displacement of Palestinians that followed; and (3) the general despair and
frustration with substandard living conditions within Gaza.
Hamas likely initially acquiesced in a bottom-up movement for direct action challenging the security barrier and the restriction of trade enforced for years by both
Egypt and Israel. It is equally likely, however, that once the scale of the protests became apparent, Hamas operatives turned to active incitement of crowds seeking to
pierce the border fence and stream onto the Israeli side of the border, established as part of “Green-Line Israel” in 1949. As of May 14, according to the Israeli High
Court of Justice, crowds seeking to storm the border had swelled to 45,000 people—a size equal to two U.S. Army divisions. Israeli villages, such as Sderot, Nachal Oz
and Kfar Aza—most of which were established by Israeli socialist kibbutzniks in 1948—are less than a mile from the security fence where these crowds were massing.
Hamas also encouraged its armed operatives to mingle in the crowds to nd opportunities to storm the fence. The IDF documented incidents in which armed cells
opened re on IDF forces from within the crowds. Public statements by both Hamas and another terrorist organization, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, indicate that at least
50 of the 62 people killed on one of the bloodiest days of the May confrontation were members of one of these groups. Many protesters utilized Molotov cocktails and
improvised explosive devices in an effort to breach the barrier and/or attack IDF personnel. In addition, a substantial number of individuals massed at the border ew
“Molotov kites” and helium balloons carrying ammable fuel that landed in Israel, causing raging brush res in areas where highly ammable cultivated elds
surround civilian communities. Hamas operatives and mobs also started res that damaged the Kerem Shalom border crossing, which conveys goods and gasoline
from Israel to Gaza. The precise number of armed individuals is dif cult to determine, given the density of the crowds at the fence. However, if even 5 percent of the
crowd was armed, that would mean more than 2,000 armed Hamas operatives at the scene.
It is therefore quite understandable that IDF commanders on scene, tasked with the mission of protecting proximate Israeli communities from an enemy that had
consistently demonstrated its determination to attack these civilians, perceived this situation as creating a dire threat. If even a fraction of these protesters and
Hamas operatives had achieved the desired breach, the situation would have grown even more exigent. Consider, for example, the challenge if even a fraction of the
huge crowd—e.g., 10 percent, or 4,500 people—had breached the fence and headed toward the Israeli villages nearby. Using a conservative calculation that 5 percent
of the crowd was armed, that would have resulted in more than 200 armed individuals heading toward the villages. It is true that the confrontation extended to several
points along the border, but this dispersion only increased the tactical challenge to the IDF by requiring them to repel multiple attempts at disparate locations. By our
own on-the-ground assessment, the modest villages on the Israeli side are approximately a ve-minute trot away from the fence. Therefore, IDF forces would surely
have prioritized targeting the border-crossers in the vicinity of such villages, which would likely have resulted in substantial casualties, including harm to both
Palestinian and Israeli civilians caught in the chaos. And if even a few Hamas operatives evaded these protective efforts, they could have in icted a serious amount of
harm. IDF personnel themselves would also be targets of Hamas and Islamic Jihad violence.
This leads to what is probably the most dif cult aspect of assessing IDF actions: What level of force was reasonable in response to the coordinated Hamas efforts?
Some may believe that no use of deadly force could have been justi ed until the fence was actually breached. But that likely was not tactically reasonable and,
therefore, not the only lawful option. First, if Israeli forces had suf cient information to support a reasonable determination that certain individuals in the crowd were
in fact Hamas belligerent operatives, that status alone would have justi ed use of lethal force. Perhaps there are policy considerations that would lead to greater
restraint at that point, such as a conduct-based threat assessment. But as a matter of law, there is no such requirement in the context of this ongoing armed con ict.
Second, even if such a determination could not be made, the question arises as to whether in this context allowing a breach to occur was a necessary predicate for an
assessment of imminent threat.
To this end, it is worth considering what an IDF unit might have been compelled to do if a breach did occur. First, there would have been an imperative to immediately
seal the breach. The dozens if not hundreds of civilians owing through would almost certainly have required employment of force to reach the breach location and
stem the ow: Military personnel would have had to disperse the crowd, set up a security perimeter, ow in engineering assets, hold off the angry crowd during repair
operations and then withdraw. How would a commander have assessed the potential risk of casualties in the execution of such an action? This is dif cult enough in
the context of ordinary civil unrest. It is exponentially more challenging when the mob includes enemy belligerents bent on exploiting that unrest. Second, with
Israeli civilian communities within one mile of the border, the IDF would have assessed the use of deadly force as necessary in response to even a small number of
individuals who penetrated the fence-line and began moving toward those communities. Nor would the IDF have been able to “swarm” massed forces to any single
point, for doing so would have created vulnerabilities at other points along the border. In short, forces in limited numbers would have been compelled to conduct
high-risk actions that probably would have resulted in an increased risk of civilian casualties.
Can a binary LOAC/law enforcement paradigm effectively address the exigencies of such a situation? We think not. As the Israeli high court observed, in the opinion
by Deputy Chief Justice Hanan Melcer, the failure to use force prior to breaches of the fence would have resulted in Hamas operatives’ in ltration into Israel and the
near-certainty of severe harm to civilians. Nonetheless, many critics assert that an imminent threat justifying the use of live re “would have only been present once

the fence had actually been breached.” Yet this rigid standard would have deprived the IDF of the authority to use force in a manner that may have actually averted
the need to use much more extensive and dangerous force, ultimately leaving the villages near the fence unprotected. In other words, the opportunity for the IDF to
halt thousands of people seeking to storm the fence on the Gaza side was a rapidly closing window of time; once that window shut and large agitated crowds moved to
the Israeli side, it would have been impossible to assure the safety of the villages nearby, and IDF personnel would have faced an increased perceived need to employ
lethal force to defend themselves and Israeli civilians. A restrictive application of law enforcement use-of-force authority requiring that IDF personnel wait for the
fence’s breach would have given Hamas a massive advantage in harming Israeli civilians.
The Israeli response to the Gaza confrontation, as upheld by the High Court of Justice, seems to recognize this inherent complexity. The hybrid approach advanced by
the government was responsive to the nature the situation: massed confrontations involving civilians protesters, other civilians directly participating in hostilities,
and belligerent members of an enemy organized armed group, all in the context of an armed con ict. In this context, it is appropriate to blend conduct-of-hostilities
rules with rules derived from the law enforcement regime. Pursuant to this approach, it is unjusti ed to assert that state forces may never use lethal force to repel
what is reasonably assessed as an imminent threat posed by a violent crowd, and speci cally use such force to prevent a breach, targeting agitators who are provoking
the crowd.
That said, state forces must follow a graduated approach consistent with the principles of necessity and proportionality. They must start with verbal warnings and
non-lethal means such as tear gas and demonstrations of force. When and if these measures fail, state personnel can resort to live re, aiming for the legs of targets.
Lethal force can also be used on individuals openly carrying arms. Generally, IDF snipers had to seek the approval of senior of cers to use live re. This approach
allowed for a tailored response to the tactical challenges inherent in the situation.
All this con rms our main point: that assessing the legality of a use of force by state security personnel necessitates careful consideration of the context of that
decision. It is simply unrealistic to assert that in a situation such as this, an actual breach of the security barrier is an essential requirement for a threat to be
reasonably assessed as imminent. Indeed, any soldier ordered to guard a perimeter against a hostile crowd determined to force a breach understands the nuanced
nature of such an imminence assessment. Similarly, the small-unit leader responsible for sealing the breach understands the inherent complexity of that mission. A
per se test for imminence in that fraught and uid situation would not t tactical reality. No legal varnish can obscure the fact that no two threat situations are
identical. As a result, there are many situations where a breach of a fence-line would not support a reasonable assessment of imminence, just as there are many in
which pre-breach activities would supply an adequate predicate. Assessing the validity of the judgment requires careful attention to context.
Public records related to these uses of force ought to trigger credible scrutiny. But there is a fundamental difference between calling for an accounting of such action
and re exively asserting the illegality of such action prior to access to the contextual facts. Like most observers, we share the concern that arises when military forces
employ lethal force against masses of protesters. We also understand that no credible military commander would authorize the use of such force casually. Yet we
understand that the law allows that complex missions may necessitate such measures and that such allowance often prevents greater bloodshed than the alternatives.
In the context of the Gaza border, both critics and those responsible for investigating these incidents should approach their task with a commitment to understanding
all aspects of the situation that those IDF units confronted and could continue to confront. They will also hopefully recognize that the IDF’s hybrid approach was a
reasonable response to that challenging situation. But the legitimacy of certain uses of force pursuant to that operational framework does require, as the Israeli high
court noted, further inquiry to ensure that tactical implementation fell within the realm of reasonableness. It is the IDF itself that has the greatest interest in the
credibility of such inquiries, as it will inform commanders of how to better manage such complex situations in the future.
Initial indications suggest that the IDF understands this: It has already initiated such inquiries. Ideally, some good can come from these incidents in the form of
greater clarity on both the appropriate legal framework for conducting such operations and how best to tactically implement that law.
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